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Ukraine Official Warns “Chance Of War With Russia Growing” As Mike Rogers Calls For Sending Weapons To Ukraine | Zero Hedge
Concurrently with out post on what the odds are of a war between the US and Russia over Ukraine, the House Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike Rogers, and war hawk, appeared on TV this morning saying that the United States ought to provide weapons to the Ukrainian army “so it could defend the country from a Russian invasion.” This is the same Mike Rogers who last August did everything in his power to perpetuate the lie that Syrians had used chemical weapons against “rebels” (who subsequently turned out to be mostly Qatari-funded Al Qaeda mercenaries and other Islamic extremists) “There are things that we can do that I think we’re not doing. I don’t think the rhetoric (from Obama administration officials) matches the reality on the ground,” he said.
Seemingly oblivious that all Russia desperately wants is further escalation in the conflict, which can then immediately be seen as a provocation for further incursions into either the Ukraine and/or other former Soviet counteries, Rogers said that, while ruling out the deployment of U.S. military forces in Ukraine, he called for sending small arms and radio equipment that the Ukrainian military could use to “protect and defend themselves. And I think that sends a very clear message.”
Absolutely it does: the message it sends is that US foreign policy has just hit rock bottom in terms of game theoretical escalation cluelessness. At least in Syria someone put some effort in fabricating YouTube videos and at least putting together a media campaign demonizing Assad. And still failed.
More from NBC:
Speaking from Tblisi, the capital of Georgia, a country that Russian forces invaded in 2008, Rogers said on NBC’s Meet the Press that the Ukrainians “passionately believe” that Russian President Vladimir Putin “will be on the move again in Ukraine, especially in the east.”
He said both Ukrainian and U.S. intelligence officials “believe that Putin is not done in Ukraine. It is very troubling. He has put all the military units he would need to move into Ukraine on its eastern border and is doing exercises.”
If Putin orders Russian forces into the Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – which are NATO member states and which the United States is obligated by the NATO treaty to defend — then “we (will) have allowed people who want to be free, who want to be independent, who want to have self-determination, and we’ve turned our back and walked away from them.”
In an apparent allusion to the seizure of Czechoslovakia which was a prelude to Hitler’s invasion of Poland in 1939, Rogers added, “The world did that once – and it was a major catastrophe.”
The full clip:
And while US neocons are warmongering, Ukraine is all too happy to raise the tension level just a bit more, hoping that NATO will finally intervene and present Putin with at least some hurdle to overrunning all of East Ukraine, using exactly the same template as already show in Crimea. From WSJ:
Ukraine’s top diplomat warned Sunday that the chances of war with Russia “are growing” due to the buildup of Moscow’s forces along his country’s eastern border. In an interview with ABC’s “This Week,” acting Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Deshchytsia said Kiev “is ready to respond” should Russia–which has already seized the Crimea–move further in Ukrainian territory.“The situation is becoming even more explosive than it was a week ago,” Mr. Deshchytsia said.
He said Ukraine’s first approach to the Russian threat on the frontier would be diplomatic. But, he said, “people are also ready to defend their homeland.”
Meanwhile, Putin is sitting back in his chair and smiling, since everything so far continues to unwind precisely according to his plan.
Ukraine Official Warns "Chance Of War With Russia Growing" As Mike Rogers Calls For Sending Weapons To Ukraine | Zero Hedge
Concurrently with out post on what the odds are of a war between the US and Russia over Ukraine, the House Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike Rogers, and war hawk, appeared on TV this morning saying that the United States ought to provide weapons to the Ukrainian army “so it could defend the country from a Russian invasion.” This is the same Mike Rogers who last August did everything in his power to perpetuate the lie that Syrians had used chemical weapons against “rebels” (who subsequently turned out to be mostly Qatari-funded Al Qaeda mercenaries and other Islamic extremists) “There are things that we can do that I think we’re not doing. I don’t think the rhetoric (from Obama administration officials) matches the reality on the ground,” he said.
Seemingly oblivious that all Russia desperately wants is further escalation in the conflict, which can then immediately be seen as a provocation for further incursions into either the Ukraine and/or other former Soviet counteries, Rogers said that, while ruling out the deployment of U.S. military forces in Ukraine, he called for sending small arms and radio equipment that the Ukrainian military could use to “protect and defend themselves. And I think that sends a very clear message.”
Absolutely it does: the message it sends is that US foreign policy has just hit rock bottom in terms of game theoretical escalation cluelessness. At least in Syria someone put some effort in fabricating YouTube videos and at least putting together a media campaign demonizing Assad. And still failed.
More from NBC:
Speaking from Tblisi, the capital of Georgia, a country that Russian forces invaded in 2008, Rogers said on NBC’s Meet the Press that the Ukrainians “passionately believe” that Russian President Vladimir Putin “will be on the move again in Ukraine, especially in the east.”
He said both Ukrainian and U.S. intelligence officials “believe that Putin is not done in Ukraine. It is very troubling. He has put all the military units he would need to move into Ukraine on its eastern border and is doing exercises.”
If Putin orders Russian forces into the Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – which are NATO member states and which the United States is obligated by the NATO treaty to defend — then “we (will) have allowed people who want to be free, who want to be independent, who want to have self-determination, and we’ve turned our back and walked away from them.”
In an apparent allusion to the seizure of Czechoslovakia which was a prelude to Hitler’s invasion of Poland in 1939, Rogers added, “The world did that once – and it was a major catastrophe.”
The full clip:
And while US neocons are warmongering, Ukraine is all too happy to raise the tension level just a bit more, hoping that NATO will finally intervene and present Putin with at least some hurdle to overrunning all of East Ukraine, using exactly the same template as already show in Crimea. From WSJ:
Ukraine’s top diplomat warned Sunday that the chances of war with Russia “are growing” due to the buildup of Moscow’s forces along his country’s eastern border. In an interview with ABC’s “This Week,” acting Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Deshchytsia said Kiev “is ready to respond” should Russia–which has already seized the Crimea–move further in Ukrainian territory.“The situation is becoming even more explosive than it was a week ago,” Mr. Deshchytsia said.
He said Ukraine’s first approach to the Russian threat on the frontier would be diplomatic. But, he said, “people are also ready to defend their homeland.”
Meanwhile, Putin is sitting back in his chair and smiling, since everything so far continues to unwind precisely according to his plan.
Testosterone Pit – Home – The “Sanction Spiral” Elegantly Spirals Out of Control
Testosterone Pit – Home – The “Sanction Spiral” Elegantly Spirals Out of Control.
The “Sanction Spiral” Elegantly Spirals Out Of Control
Attorneys with the SEC’s Investment Management Division are exhorting managers of registered investment funds, such as your mutual fund, to disclose their holdings in Russia and warn of the risks associated with them, now that the Crimean debacle has turned into a magnificent sanction spiral. “Several people familiar with the matter” had been talking toReuters. The SEC is apparently fretting that the funds aren’t truthful with investors and aren’t even thinking about how to respond to the possible outcomes of the crisis.
Investment Management Division Director Norm Champ, when contacted by Reuters, didn’t even deny it. “We want to be proactive,” he said.
The Division contacted asset managers on other occasions when civil unrest erupted or when things threatened to blow up; it wanted to make sure managers weren’t omitting or misrepresenting material information – for example, during the uprising in Egypt in 2011, when the Cairo stock market simply shut down. But this time it’s different: the lawyers at the Investment Management Division were joined by another group of SEC lawyers who focus on risk examinations.
Would the White House be trying behind the scenes to give investors second thoughts about plowing money into Russia? Would it be trying to demolish Russian stocks, bonds, and the ruble? Naw.
The efforts by the SEC, which started “over a week ago,” were accompanied by a White House announcement that 5 million barrels would be released from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. WTI tanked. Russia, a huge energy exporter, depends on its oil and gas revenues, and knocking down the price of oil could wreak havoc on the Russian economy. It was a declaration that commodities would be used as a weapon against the Putin Regime.
Then on Tuesday, White House spokesman Jay Carney launched another attack on the Russian markets at a press briefing. In light of the sanctions the US and the EU were slapping on Russia, its economy would pay the price, he said. “I wouldn’t, if I were you, invest in Russian equities right now, unless you’re going short.”
Shaken to its roots by these threats, Russia annexed the Crimea and picked a new target: Estonia. A Russian diplomat told the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva on Wednesday that Russia was “concerned” by the treatment of the ethnic Russian minority “in Estonia as well as in Ukraine” … even while Vice President Joe Biden was in Lithuania to calm tattered nerves in the Baltics and the EU.
On Thursday, German Chancellor Merkel announced in Parliament, shortly before the EU summit in Brussels, that the EU would come up with new sanctions, such as expanding the list of Russians subject to travel limitations and freezing assets. And if the situation escalates, there would be “without doubt” economic sanctions, she said. Russia was “largely isolated in all international organizations.” And the G-8, which includes Russia, and whose upcoming shindig has already been cancelled, “no longer exists.”
She was immediately attacked by the parliamentary leader of the opposition Left Party, Gregor Gysi, who accused the government of double standards; the separation of Kosovo too had been a breach of international law, he said, but it had been supported by the German government at the time. The transitional Ukrainian government wasn’t legitimate, he said. “Fascists are part of this government, and we want to give them money?!” Under pressure from the US, Merkel was imposing sanctions on Russia to the detriment of Europe, he said. That’s “moral cowardice.”
The “Putin Doctrine” was what SPD parliamentary leader Thomas Oppermann, who is part of Germany’s governing Grand Coalition, was fretting about. Under that doctrine, Russia could intervene if ethnic Russians were perceived to be in danger outside Russia. It would give Russia an automatic right to intervene anywhere, he said. “Such a right does not exist, and such a right cannot exist.”
Hours later, President Obama announced he’d slapped new sanctions on a “number” of oligarchs, additional Russian government officials, and a bank that provides services to them. The White House was working “closely” with the EU “to develop more severe actions that could be taken if Russia continues to escalate the situation.” Then he urged US Lawmakers to approve the aid package for Ukraine and urged the IMF to put its aid package together pronto. Alas, read…. Aid for the Ukraine “Will Be Stolen” – Former Ukrainian Minister of Economy
As Obama’s words were still echoing around the world, the Russian Foreign Ministry shot back: nine US officials, including Speaker of the House John Boehner and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, would be barred from entering Russia. And it published the list on its website.
Delicious irony: that boring list with nine names on it, issued by a Russian ministry whose website rarely gets shared in the social media, lit up a mini-firestorm on VK.com, the second largest social network in Europe after Facebook, and one of the most popular sites in Russia. The list got, as I’m writing this, 538 VK “likes.” Not sure if Obama’s list got anyFacebook likes.
Not to be left out, Standard & Poor’s slammed Russia by lowering its outlook to Negativefrom Stable. “In our view, heightened geopolitical risk and the prospect of US and EU economic sanctions following Russia’s incorporation of Crimea could reduce the flow of potential investment, trigger rising capital outflows, and further weaken Russia’s already deteriorating economic performance.”
The Sanction Spiral works in a myriad ways and performs, as we can see every day, outright miracles. It spirals elegantly higher and higher and takes on grotesque forms. And by the looks of it, no one at the top has a clue how to back out of it. Yet stock and bond markets in the US and Europe, stuffed to the gills with central-bank liquidity and intoxicated by free money, the only thing that really matters anymore these crazy days of ours, are blissfully ignoring the entire drama, and what may eventually come of it.
The first official warning shot was fired. Not by a Putin advisor that can be brushed off, but by Alexey Ulyukaev, Russia’s Minister of Economy and former Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank. A major escalation. Read…. Kremlin: If The US Tries To Hurt Russia’s Economy, Russia Will Target The Dollar System
Forget Russia Dumping U.S. Treasuries … Here’s the REAL Economic Threat Washington’s Blog
Forget Russia Dumping U.S. Treasuries … Here’s the REAL Economic Threat Washington’s Blog.
Russia Could Crush the Petrodollar
Russia threatened to dump its U.S. treasuries if America imposed sanctions regarding Russia’s action in the Crimea.
Zero Hedge argues that Russia has already done so.
But veteran investor Jim Sinclair argues that Russia has a much scarier financial attack which Russia can use against the U.S.
Specifically, Sinclair says that if Russia accepts payment for oil and gas in any currency other than the dollar – whether it’s gold, the Euro, the Ruble, the Rupee, or anything else – then the U.S. petrodollar system will collapse:
Indeed, one of the main pillars for U.S. power is the petrodollar, and the U.S. is desperate for the dollar to maintain reserve status. Some wise commentators have argued that recent U.S. wars have really been about keeping the rest of the world on the petrodollar standard.
The theory is that – after Nixon took the U.S. off the gold standard, which had made the dollar the world’s reserve currency – America salvaged that role by adopting the petrodollar. Specifically, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia agreed that all oil and gas would be priced in dollars, so the rest of the world had to use dollars for most transactions.
But Reuters notes that Russia may be mere months away from signing a bilateral trade deal with China, where China would buy huge quantities of Russian oil and gas.
Zero Hedge argues:
Add bilateral trade denominated in either Rubles or Renminbi (or gold), add Iran, Iraq, India, and soon the Saudis (China’s largest foreign source of crude, whose crown prince also happened to meet president Xi Jinping last week to expand trade further) and wave goodbye to the petrodollar.
As we noted last year:
The average life expectancy for a fiat currency is less than 40 years.
But what about “reserve currencies”, like the U.S. dollar?
JP Morgan noted last year that “reserve currencies” have a limited shelf-life:
As the table shows, U.S. reserve status has already lasted as long as Portugal and the Netherland’s reigns. It won’t happen tomorrow, or next week … but the end of the dollar’s rein is coming nonetheless, and China and many other countries are calling for a new reserve currency.
Remember, China is entering into more and more major deals with other countries to settle trades in Yuans, instead of dollars. This includes the European Union (the world’s largest economy) [and also Russia].
And China is quietly becoming a gold superpower…
Given that China has surpassed the U.S. as the world’s largest importer of oil, Saudi Arabia is moving away from the U.S. … and towards China. (Some even argue that the world will switch from the petrodollar to the petroYUAN. We’re not convinced that will happen.)
In any event, a switch to pricing petroleum in anything other than dollars exclusively – whether a single alternative currency, gold, or even a mix of currencies or commodities – would spell the end of the dollar as the world’s reserve currency.
For that reason, Sinclair – no fan of either Russia or Putin – urges American leaders to back away from an economic confrontation with Russia, arguing that the U.S. would be the loser.
Forget Russia Dumping U.S. Treasuries … Here's the REAL Economic Threat Washington's Blog
Forget Russia Dumping U.S. Treasuries … Here’s the REAL Economic Threat Washington’s Blog.
Russia Could Crush the Petrodollar
Russia threatened to dump its U.S. treasuries if America imposed sanctions regarding Russia’s action in the Crimea.
Zero Hedge argues that Russia has already done so.
But veteran investor Jim Sinclair argues that Russia has a much scarier financial attack which Russia can use against the U.S.
Specifically, Sinclair says that if Russia accepts payment for oil and gas in any currency other than the dollar – whether it’s gold, the Euro, the Ruble, the Rupee, or anything else – then the U.S. petrodollar system will collapse:
Indeed, one of the main pillars for U.S. power is the petrodollar, and the U.S. is desperate for the dollar to maintain reserve status. Some wise commentators have argued that recent U.S. wars have really been about keeping the rest of the world on the petrodollar standard.
The theory is that – after Nixon took the U.S. off the gold standard, which had made the dollar the world’s reserve currency – America salvaged that role by adopting the petrodollar. Specifically, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia agreed that all oil and gas would be priced in dollars, so the rest of the world had to use dollars for most transactions.
But Reuters notes that Russia may be mere months away from signing a bilateral trade deal with China, where China would buy huge quantities of Russian oil and gas.
Zero Hedge argues:
Add bilateral trade denominated in either Rubles or Renminbi (or gold), add Iran, Iraq, India, and soon the Saudis (China’s largest foreign source of crude, whose crown prince also happened to meet president Xi Jinping last week to expand trade further) and wave goodbye to the petrodollar.
As we noted last year:
The average life expectancy for a fiat currency is less than 40 years.
But what about “reserve currencies”, like the U.S. dollar?
JP Morgan noted last year that “reserve currencies” have a limited shelf-life:
As the table shows, U.S. reserve status has already lasted as long as Portugal and the Netherland’s reigns. It won’t happen tomorrow, or next week … but the end of the dollar’s rein is coming nonetheless, and China and many other countries are calling for a new reserve currency.
Remember, China is entering into more and more major deals with other countries to settle trades in Yuans, instead of dollars. This includes the European Union (the world’s largest economy) [and also Russia].
And China is quietly becoming a gold superpower…
Given that China has surpassed the U.S. as the world’s largest importer of oil, Saudi Arabia is moving away from the U.S. … and towards China. (Some even argue that the world will switch from the petrodollar to the petroYUAN. We’re not convinced that will happen.)
In any event, a switch to pricing petroleum in anything other than dollars exclusively – whether a single alternative currency, gold, or even a mix of currencies or commodities – would spell the end of the dollar as the world’s reserve currency.
For that reason, Sinclair – no fan of either Russia or Putin – urges American leaders to back away from an economic confrontation with Russia, arguing that the U.S. would be the loser.
S&P Brings Out The Big Policy Guns – Downgrades Russia To Outlook Negative | Zero Hedge
S&P Brings Out The Big Policy Guns – Downgrades Russia To Outlook Negative | Zero Hedge.
S&P, still deep in the mire of a legal battle with the US government, has decided now is an opportune time to cut the ratings outlook on Russia:
- *RUSSIAN FEDERATION OUTLOOK TO NEGATIVE FROM STABLE BY S&P
- *S&P SEES EU-U.S. IMPOSING FURTHER SANCTIONS
Russia remains a BBB credit (but with the outlook shift remains open to a downgrade with 24 months). S&P has cut 2014 GDP forecast to 1.2% and 2015 to 2.2%. Of course, we are sure, this would have nothing to do with currying favors with the US government (who threatened them when they downgraded the USA). Full report below.
S&P Reduces Russian Federation outlook to Negative from Stable.
Below is the full report:
OVERVIEW
• In our view, heightened geopolitical risk and the prospect of U.S. and EU economic sanctions following Russia’s incorporation of Crimea could reduce the flow of potential investment, trigger rising capital outflows, and further weaken Russia’s already deteriorating economic performance.
• We are therefore revising the outlook on our long-term sovereign credit ratings on Russia to negative from stable.
• We are affirming our ‘BBB/A-2’ foreign currency and ‘BBB+/A-2’ local currency ratings on the Russian Federation.
As a “sovereign rating” (as defined in EU CRA Regulation 1060/2009 “EU CRA Regulation”), the ratings on the Russian Federation are subject to certain publication restrictions set out in Art 8a of the EU CRA Regulation, including publication in accordance with a pre-established calendar (see “Calendar Of 2014 Publication Dates For EMEA Sovereign, Regional, And Local Government Ratings,” published Dec. 30, 2013, on RatingsDirect). Under the EU CRA Regulation, deviations from the announced calendar are allowed only in limited circumstances and must be accompanied by a detailed explanation of the reasons for the deviation. In this case, the reason for the deviation is the material and unanticipated intensification of geopolitical risks since our most recent release on Dec. 13, 2013, the introduction of sanctions, and the increased financial and economic downside risks to Russia related to these events. The next scheduled rating publication on the sovereign rating of the Russian Federation will be on April 25, 2014.
RATING ACTION
On March 20, 2014, Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services revised its outlook on the Russian Federation (Russia) to negative from stable. At the same time, we affirmed our ‘BBB/A-2’ foreign currency and ‘BBB+/A-2’ local currency long- and short-term sovereign credit ratings on Russia.
We also affirmed our ‘ruAAA’ long-term national scale rating on Russia.
RATIONALE
The outlook revision reflects our view of the material and unanticipated economic and financial consequences that EU and U.S. sanctions could have on Russia’s creditworthiness following Russia’s incorporation of Crimea, which the international community currently considers legally to be a part of Ukraine.
In February 2014, pro-Russian forces took control of Crimea. As a consequence, on March 6, the European Union (EU) and the U.S. agreed on an initial round of sanctions, as part of a staged approach to imposing sanctions on Russia. On March 16, a referendum was held in Crimea in which approximately 97% of voters reportedly were in favor of Crimea joining Russia. The following day, the EU and U.S. announced that they viewed the referendum as illegitimate and sanctioned certain Russian and Ukrainian nationals through travel bans and asset freezes. On March 18, Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, signed a decree incorporating Crimea into the Russian Federation which was ratified by parliament today.
We expect that the EU and U.S. will impose further sanctions.
In our view, the deteriorating geopolitical situation has already had a negative impact on Russia’s economy. The Central Bank of the Russian Federation appears to have abandoned its policy of increased currency flexibility and limited intervention in the foreign-exchange market. The Central Bank is now focused on stabilizing financial markets in light of the inflationary impact of the around 10% depreciation of the currency so far this year and the significant capital outflow, which we estimate at about $60 billion in the first quarter of 2014, similar to the level for the whole of 2013. The Central Bank also called an extraordinary meeting in March, raising its benchmark interest rate by 150 basis points to 7%.
Economic growth in Russia slowed to 1.3% in 2013, the lowest rate since 1999–excluding the economic contraction in 2009. We expect a further modest deceleration in growth this year and have lowered our GDP growth forecasts for 2014 and 2015 to 1.2% and 2.2%, respectively, from 2.2% and 3.0% in December 2013. In our view, there is a significant downside risk that growth will fall well below 1% if the uncertainties caused by the geopolitical tensions do not subside in the near term.
In our view, there is a material risk that the conflict between Russia and Ukraine could extend beyond Crimea and that violence between pro- and anti-Russian protesters could spread to other cities in Eastern Ukraine. Should the situation deteriorate, we believe further and wider sanctions could be imposed against Russian institutions and individuals, potentially including trade restrictions. In our view, these sanctions could further undermine Russia’s economic growth prospects. We note, however, that sanctions, particularly those that might be imposed by EU countries, could be tempered by European economic trade and energy interests.
Our ratings on Russia continue to be supported by its relatively strong external and government balance sheets. The ratings remain constrained by structural weaknesses in Russia’s economy, in particular the strong dependence on hydrocarbons and other commodities. Further constraints are what we view as comparatively weak governance and economic institutions that impede the economy’s competitiveness, investment climate, and business environment.
The Russian government’s finances continue to be buoyed by strong commodity revenues, particularly from oil. These account for almost one-half of the government’s budget revenues, but also leave it exposed to swings in commodity prices. To mitigate this vulnerability, the government has instituted a fiscal rule from 2013, which caps government expenditure based on long-term historical oil prices. This fiscal rule is designed to lead to the accumulation of assets in times of high oil prices, and to the drawing on fiscal assets in times of low oil prices, reducing the procyclicality of fiscal policy. In our view, the government’s commitment to this fiscal rule will likely be significantly tested by the recent further deterioration in growth prospects, while off-budget measures to support additional spending could also increase. We estimate Russia’s 2013 general government budget to have recorded a deficit of 0.6% of GDP. Based on our expectation that commodity revenues will decline slightly on the back of a slightly weaker oil price (falling to $95 by 2015), we think the general government deficit will gradually worsen, reaching 1.5% of GDP by 2016, just outside the level targeted by the fiscal rule, and implying an average annual change in general government debt of 1.5% of GDP over 2013-2016.
Russia’s aging population will be a source of considerable medium- to long-term fiscal pressure. In a no-policy-change scenario, we expect the aging of the population to add more than 10% of GDP to government spending by 2050 compared with 2010 levels. While the government has been adjusting pension system parameters, it has so far shied away from more decisively tackling the issue. We now estimate the Russian government to be in a marginal net debtor position due to revised data on the outstanding stock of gross general government debt. Nevertheless, low levels of gross debt imply low general government interest payments at about 2% of revenues during 2014-2016.
Commodity exports are also behind Russia’s persistent current account surpluses, resulting in a net external asset position of about 4% of GDP in 2014. Measured in terms of narrow net external debt, that is, external debt minus liquid external assets held by the public and banking sector, we expect Russia to be in a small net external creditor position. This strong external asset position has been declining since reaching a peak of 34% in 2009. We note, however, that due to consistently negative errors and omissions in Russia’s balance of payments (averaging almost $8 billion annually, or 1.5% of CAR in 2007 to 2013) the reported net asset position is considerably lower than implied by the large current account surpluses.
We expect the current account surpluses to disappear by 2015, owing to imports rising faster than exports. Further ruble weakness could weigh on imports and keep current account deficits from occurring a little later, but we believe the longer-term trend of a weakening current account will remain in place even so. Gross external financing needs (current account payments plus short-term external debt by remaining maturity) will amount to 70% of CARs and usable reserves in 2014, in our view. Dependence on commodity exports results in terms-of-trade volatility, although past experience has shown that imports tend to adjust strongly, offsetting part of a commodity price-induced drop in export revenue.
Russia’s political institutions remain comparatively weak and political power is highly centralized. Protesters, opposition members, nongovernmental organizations, and liberal members of the political establishment have come under increasing pressure. We do not expect the government to decisively and effectively tackle the long-standing structural obstacles to stronger economic growth over our forecast horizon (2014-2017). These obstacles include high perceived corruption, comparatively weak rule of law, the state’s pervasive role in the economy, and a challenging business and investment climate.
OUTLOOK
The negative outlook reflects our view that there is at least a one-in-three chance that we could reassess the risks to Russia’s creditworthiness based on its deteriorating external profile and reduced monetary policy flexibility. As a result, we could lower our ratings on Russia within the next 24 months. Geopolitical reaction to Russia’s incorporation of Crimea could further reduce the flow of potential investment and negatively affect already weak economic growth, which would provide a further basis for lowering the ratings. Similarly, we could equalize the local and foreign currency ratings on Russia if we were to view Russia’s transition toward a more flexible exchange rate regime as having stalled.
We could revise the outlook to stable if Russia’s economy were to prove resilient to the current challenges, resulting in a return to a policy of a more flexible exchange rate, and if its external and fiscal buffers were to remain in line with our current expectations.
S&P Brings Out The Big Policy Guns – Downgrades Russia To Outlook Negative | Zero Hedge
S&P Brings Out The Big Policy Guns – Downgrades Russia To Outlook Negative | Zero Hedge.
S&P, still deep in the mire of a legal battle with the US government, has decided now is an opportune time to cut the ratings outlook on Russia:
- *RUSSIAN FEDERATION OUTLOOK TO NEGATIVE FROM STABLE BY S&P
- *S&P SEES EU-U.S. IMPOSING FURTHER SANCTIONS
Russia remains a BBB credit (but with the outlook shift remains open to a downgrade with 24 months). S&P has cut 2014 GDP forecast to 1.2% and 2015 to 2.2%. Of course, we are sure, this would have nothing to do with currying favors with the US government (who threatened them when they downgraded the USA). Full report below.
S&P Reduces Russian Federation outlook to Negative from Stable.
Below is the full report:
OVERVIEW
• In our view, heightened geopolitical risk and the prospect of U.S. and EU economic sanctions following Russia’s incorporation of Crimea could reduce the flow of potential investment, trigger rising capital outflows, and further weaken Russia’s already deteriorating economic performance.
• We are therefore revising the outlook on our long-term sovereign credit ratings on Russia to negative from stable.
• We are affirming our ‘BBB/A-2’ foreign currency and ‘BBB+/A-2’ local currency ratings on the Russian Federation.
As a “sovereign rating” (as defined in EU CRA Regulation 1060/2009 “EU CRA Regulation”), the ratings on the Russian Federation are subject to certain publication restrictions set out in Art 8a of the EU CRA Regulation, including publication in accordance with a pre-established calendar (see “Calendar Of 2014 Publication Dates For EMEA Sovereign, Regional, And Local Government Ratings,” published Dec. 30, 2013, on RatingsDirect). Under the EU CRA Regulation, deviations from the announced calendar are allowed only in limited circumstances and must be accompanied by a detailed explanation of the reasons for the deviation. In this case, the reason for the deviation is the material and unanticipated intensification of geopolitical risks since our most recent release on Dec. 13, 2013, the introduction of sanctions, and the increased financial and economic downside risks to Russia related to these events. The next scheduled rating publication on the sovereign rating of the Russian Federation will be on April 25, 2014.
RATING ACTION
On March 20, 2014, Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services revised its outlook on the Russian Federation (Russia) to negative from stable. At the same time, we affirmed our ‘BBB/A-2’ foreign currency and ‘BBB+/A-2’ local currency long- and short-term sovereign credit ratings on Russia.
We also affirmed our ‘ruAAA’ long-term national scale rating on Russia.
RATIONALE
The outlook revision reflects our view of the material and unanticipated economic and financial consequences that EU and U.S. sanctions could have on Russia’s creditworthiness following Russia’s incorporation of Crimea, which the international community currently considers legally to be a part of Ukraine.
In February 2014, pro-Russian forces took control of Crimea. As a consequence, on March 6, the European Union (EU) and the U.S. agreed on an initial round of sanctions, as part of a staged approach to imposing sanctions on Russia. On March 16, a referendum was held in Crimea in which approximately 97% of voters reportedly were in favor of Crimea joining Russia. The following day, the EU and U.S. announced that they viewed the referendum as illegitimate and sanctioned certain Russian and Ukrainian nationals through travel bans and asset freezes. On March 18, Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, signed a decree incorporating Crimea into the Russian Federation which was ratified by parliament today.
We expect that the EU and U.S. will impose further sanctions.
In our view, the deteriorating geopolitical situation has already had a negative impact on Russia’s economy. The Central Bank of the Russian Federation appears to have abandoned its policy of increased currency flexibility and limited intervention in the foreign-exchange market. The Central Bank is now focused on stabilizing financial markets in light of the inflationary impact of the around 10% depreciation of the currency so far this year and the significant capital outflow, which we estimate at about $60 billion in the first quarter of 2014, similar to the level for the whole of 2013. The Central Bank also called an extraordinary meeting in March, raising its benchmark interest rate by 150 basis points to 7%.
Economic growth in Russia slowed to 1.3% in 2013, the lowest rate since 1999–excluding the economic contraction in 2009. We expect a further modest deceleration in growth this year and have lowered our GDP growth forecasts for 2014 and 2015 to 1.2% and 2.2%, respectively, from 2.2% and 3.0% in December 2013. In our view, there is a significant downside risk that growth will fall well below 1% if the uncertainties caused by the geopolitical tensions do not subside in the near term.
In our view, there is a material risk that the conflict between Russia and Ukraine could extend beyond Crimea and that violence between pro- and anti-Russian protesters could spread to other cities in Eastern Ukraine. Should the situation deteriorate, we believe further and wider sanctions could be imposed against Russian institutions and individuals, potentially including trade restrictions. In our view, these sanctions could further undermine Russia’s economic growth prospects. We note, however, that sanctions, particularly those that might be imposed by EU countries, could be tempered by European economic trade and energy interests.
Our ratings on Russia continue to be supported by its relatively strong external and government balance sheets. The ratings remain constrained by structural weaknesses in Russia’s economy, in particular the strong dependence on hydrocarbons and other commodities. Further constraints are what we view as comparatively weak governance and economic institutions that impede the economy’s competitiveness, investment climate, and business environment.
The Russian government’s finances continue to be buoyed by strong commodity revenues, particularly from oil. These account for almost one-half of the government’s budget revenues, but also leave it exposed to swings in commodity prices. To mitigate this vulnerability, the government has instituted a fiscal rule from 2013, which caps government expenditure based on long-term historical oil prices. This fiscal rule is designed to lead to the accumulation of assets in times of high oil prices, and to the drawing on fiscal assets in times of low oil prices, reducing the procyclicality of fiscal policy. In our view, the government’s commitment to this fiscal rule will likely be significantly tested by the recent further deterioration in growth prospects, while off-budget measures to support additional spending could also increase. We estimate Russia’s 2013 general government budget to have recorded a deficit of 0.6% of GDP. Based on our expectation that commodity revenues will decline slightly on the back of a slightly weaker oil price (falling to $95 by 2015), we think the general government deficit will gradually worsen, reaching 1.5% of GDP by 2016, just outside the level targeted by the fiscal rule, and implying an average annual change in general government debt of 1.5% of GDP over 2013-2016.
Russia’s aging population will be a source of considerable medium- to long-term fiscal pressure. In a no-policy-change scenario, we expect the aging of the population to add more than 10% of GDP to government spending by 2050 compared with 2010 levels. While the government has been adjusting pension system parameters, it has so far shied away from more decisively tackling the issue. We now estimate the Russian government to be in a marginal net debtor position due to revised data on the outstanding stock of gross general government debt. Nevertheless, low levels of gross debt imply low general government interest payments at about 2% of revenues during 2014-2016.
Commodity exports are also behind Russia’s persistent current account surpluses, resulting in a net external asset position of about 4% of GDP in 2014. Measured in terms of narrow net external debt, that is, external debt minus liquid external assets held by the public and banking sector, we expect Russia to be in a small net external creditor position. This strong external asset position has been declining since reaching a peak of 34% in 2009. We note, however, that due to consistently negative errors and omissions in Russia’s balance of payments (averaging almost $8 billion annually, or 1.5% of CAR in 2007 to 2013) the reported net asset position is considerably lower than implied by the large current account surpluses.
We expect the current account surpluses to disappear by 2015, owing to imports rising faster than exports. Further ruble weakness could weigh on imports and keep current account deficits from occurring a little later, but we believe the longer-term trend of a weakening current account will remain in place even so. Gross external financing needs (current account payments plus short-term external debt by remaining maturity) will amount to 70% of CARs and usable reserves in 2014, in our view. Dependence on commodity exports results in terms-of-trade volatility, although past experience has shown that imports tend to adjust strongly, offsetting part of a commodity price-induced drop in export revenue.
Russia’s political institutions remain comparatively weak and political power is highly centralized. Protesters, opposition members, nongovernmental organizations, and liberal members of the political establishment have come under increasing pressure. We do not expect the government to decisively and effectively tackle the long-standing structural obstacles to stronger economic growth over our forecast horizon (2014-2017). These obstacles include high perceived corruption, comparatively weak rule of law, the state’s pervasive role in the economy, and a challenging business and investment climate.
OUTLOOK
The negative outlook reflects our view that there is at least a one-in-three chance that we could reassess the risks to Russia’s creditworthiness based on its deteriorating external profile and reduced monetary policy flexibility. As a result, we could lower our ratings on Russia within the next 24 months. Geopolitical reaction to Russia’s incorporation of Crimea could further reduce the flow of potential investment and negatively affect already weak economic growth, which would provide a further basis for lowering the ratings. Similarly, we could equalize the local and foreign currency ratings on Russia if we were to view Russia’s transition toward a more flexible exchange rate regime as having stalled.
We could revise the outlook to stable if Russia’s economy were to prove resilient to the current challenges, resulting in a return to a policy of a more flexible exchange rate, and if its external and fiscal buffers were to remain in line with our current expectations.
Russian Forces Attack Simferopol Military Unit; 1 Injured, According To Reports | Zero Hedge
Russian Forces Attack Simferopol Military Unit; 1 Injured, According To Reports | Zero Hedge.
It seems, despite all the market’s belief that Putin would go quietly into the night once more, that the situation is escalating:
- *GUNMEN STORM UKRAINE ARMY INSTALLATIONS IN CRIMEA: UKRAINE DEFMIN SELEZNYOV
- *GUNMEN STORMING CRIMEA BUILDINGS SHOOTING IN AIR: SELEZNYOV
- *UKRAINIAN OFFICER WOUNDED BY LIVE AMMUNITION, HAYDUK SAYS
- *ATTACKS ON UKRAINIAN UNITS INCREASING: NAVY CHIEF HAYDUK
Of course, the big question now is how will Ukraine respond? Because attacking (and injuring) citizens sure seems like a red-line someone should not be crossing (although, as per the referendum, that region is now Russian).
#Crimean unit under attack is the photogrammetric center of the Chief Directorate of Operational Support of the Armed Forces of #Ukraine |PR
— Euromaidan PR (@EuromaidanPR) March 18, 2014
BREAKING #Ukrainian military unit in #Simferopol under attack. #Russian snipers on the scene, one injured! -D.Tymchuk |PR News #Crimea
— Euromaidan PR (@EuromaidanPR) March 18, 2014
Of course there is no confirmation that these are “Russian” troops per se but it is on the heels of news (via Slashdot) that:
this excerpt from The Examiner: “The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) confirmed March 16 the arrest of a group of Russians in the Zaporizhzhia (Zaporozhye) region of Ukraine. The men were armed with firearms, explosives and unspecified ‘special technical means’. This follows the March 14 arrest … of several Russians dressed black uniforms with no insignia, armed with AKS-74 assault rifles and in possession of numerous ID cards under various names. One of which was an ID card of Military Intelligence Directorate of the Russian armed forces; commonly known as ‘Spetsnaz’.
And the response by Ukraine has to be weighed based on this statement from the PM:
- *UKRAINE WON’T RECOGNIZE CRIMEA ANNEXATION, TURCHYNOV SAYS
- *UKRAINE SEEKS TO AVOID CRIMEA ESCALATION, HAYDUK SAYS
- *RUSSIAN TROOPS BLOCKING 38 UKRAINE UNITS IN CRIMEA, HAYDUK SAYS
Russian Forces Attack Simferopol Military Unit; 1 Injured, According To Reports | Zero Hedge
Russian Forces Attack Simferopol Military Unit; 1 Injured, According To Reports | Zero Hedge.
It seems, despite all the market’s belief that Putin would go quietly into the night once more, that the situation is escalating:
- *GUNMEN STORM UKRAINE ARMY INSTALLATIONS IN CRIMEA: UKRAINE DEFMIN SELEZNYOV
- *GUNMEN STORMING CRIMEA BUILDINGS SHOOTING IN AIR: SELEZNYOV
- *UKRAINIAN OFFICER WOUNDED BY LIVE AMMUNITION, HAYDUK SAYS
- *ATTACKS ON UKRAINIAN UNITS INCREASING: NAVY CHIEF HAYDUK
Of course, the big question now is how will Ukraine respond? Because attacking (and injuring) citizens sure seems like a red-line someone should not be crossing (although, as per the referendum, that region is now Russian).
#Crimean unit under attack is the photogrammetric center of the Chief Directorate of Operational Support of the Armed Forces of #Ukraine |PR
— Euromaidan PR (@EuromaidanPR) March 18, 2014
BREAKING #Ukrainian military unit in #Simferopol under attack. #Russian snipers on the scene, one injured! -D.Tymchuk |PR News #Crimea
— Euromaidan PR (@EuromaidanPR) March 18, 2014
Of course there is no confirmation that these are “Russian” troops per se but it is on the heels of news (via Slashdot) that:
this excerpt from The Examiner: “The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) confirmed March 16 the arrest of a group of Russians in the Zaporizhzhia (Zaporozhye) region of Ukraine. The men were armed with firearms, explosives and unspecified ‘special technical means’. This follows the March 14 arrest … of several Russians dressed black uniforms with no insignia, armed with AKS-74 assault rifles and in possession of numerous ID cards under various names. One of which was an ID card of Military Intelligence Directorate of the Russian armed forces; commonly known as ‘Spetsnaz’.
And the response by Ukraine has to be weighed based on this statement from the PM:
- *UKRAINE WON’T RECOGNIZE CRIMEA ANNEXATION, TURCHYNOV SAYS
- *UKRAINE SEEKS TO AVOID CRIMEA ESCALATION, HAYDUK SAYS
- *RUSSIAN TROOPS BLOCKING 38 UKRAINE UNITS IN CRIMEA, HAYDUK SAYS