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Inexpensive oil vanishing at alarming rate  |  Peak Oil News and Message Boards

Inexpensive oil vanishing at alarming rate  |  Peak Oil News and Message Boards.

Inexpensive oil vanishing at alarming rate

Inexpensive oil vanishing at alarming rate thumbnailThe United States is awash in shale oil. Iran, once OPEC’s second-largest producer, is slowly ramping up output. Oil consumption growth in the Western world has been somewhere between negative and flat since the 2008 financial crisis. The “peak oil” theory has pretty much vanished, along with The Oil Drum, the bible of peak oil believers. Rest in peace.

Or turn in your grave, for the oil price charts tell a different story.

On the New York Mercantile Exchange, crude oil futures are up 13 per cent over one year. Since 2009, they have climbed every year except 2012. In Europe, the Brent crude futures are flat over the year after rising three years on the trot. Brent, the de facto global benchmark, trades at about $108 (U.S.) a barrel; West Texas Intermediate, the North American benchmark, is at $97. For the sake of argument, let’s say the world is valuing oil at $100. You would think the price would be far less as the United States challenges Saudi Arabia for top producer status.

While the oil forecasters were pumping out bearish calls, the market itself has stuck to its triple-digit price outlook. Oil buyers apparently know the Western world’s economic recovery will boost consumption, since growth and oil use are aligned. That’s not all. They also know that the math doesn’t work: Prices can’t go into gradual, long-term decline, or even stay flat, when the world’s conventional oil fields are in fairly rapid decline.

Exotic production – oil sands, biofuels, natural gas liquids – are supposed to fill the gap. But this so-called unconventional production is highly expensive and quite possibly insufficient to cover the drop off in cheap, conventional production. Prices will rise to the point that demand will have to level off or fall. The “peak oil” and “peak demand” theories are really opposite sides of the same coin.

A few days ago, Richard Miller, the former BP geochemist turned independent oil consultant, delivered a sobering lecture at University College London that laid out the case for dwindling future oil supply. His talk was based on published data from the U.S. Energy Information Agency, the International Energy Agency, the International Monetary Fund and other official sources.

The data leave no doubt that the inexpensive oil is vanishing quickly. Conventional oil production peaked in 2008 at about 70 million barrels a day and is declining by about 3.3 million barrels a day, every year. Saudi Arabia pumps about 10 million barrels a day. The math says a new Saudi Arabia has to be found every three years to offset the conventional oil drop off. Good luck. Now you know why Russians, Canadians and Americans are so keen to lock up the Arctic, the alleged keeper of vast new reserves.

About one-quarter of conventional production comes from the 20 biggest fields and most of them are in decline, some precipitously. North Sea oil production peaked at 4.5-million barrels a day in 1999. This year’s production is forecast at between 1.2 million and 1.4 million barrels a day. The so-called Forties field, the North Sea’s biggest, has been losing 9 per cent a year for more than 20 years. Ditto two other North Sea biggies – Brent and Ninian.

Great Britain shed its status as an energy powerhouse about a decade ago, when it became a net energy importer. Its energy import bill is horrendous. Last year, Britain spent almost £22-billion ($38-billion) buying foreign oil, natural gas and coal.

Repeat all over the world, from Mexico to Indonesia. Indonesia’s oil production has been in steady decline since the mid-1990s, and the country has gone from oil exporter to importer, at which point it got kicked out of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. While new exploration and technologies will extend the life of some of the gasping old fields, the long-term downward trend is intact.

The conventional fields are running out of puff just as world demand is climbing again, which can only put upward pressure on prices. This week, the IEA estimated that oil demand will rise by 1.2 million barrels a day in 2014, or 1.3 per cent, to 92.4 million barrels.

The increase is driven by economic recovery and ever-rising demand in China and elsewhere in the developing world. China is willing to pay almost any price for oil because oil drives growth more than it does in the West, where energy use is less intensive per unit of economic output. China has also developed a love affair with traffic jams. The number of cars and motorbikes in China increased twentyfold between 2000 and 2010. It is forecast to double again in the next 20 years.

The oil shills, the tech geeks and most, but not all, oil companies would have you believe that non-conventional energy will fill the gap as the cheap, easy-to-pump oil heads gently into the night. It might, but at what price and cost to the environment? Or it might not at any price.

Deep-sea production is monstrously expensive and risky, as BP found out when its Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico blew up. The Alberta oil sands also spew out more carbon dioxide than conventional production. Most biofuels, such as U.S. corn-based ethanol, are taxpayer-subsidized economic horror shows with dubious environmental benefits.

The peak oil crowd has thinned out, to be sure, but it won’t disappear. Gushing U.S. shale oil doesn’t mean oil is about to become cheap and plentiful. The fall off in conventional oil production is real, and scary.

Globe and Mail

 

The IEA raises a little warning flag on future oil production – World Energy Outlook 2013 | ASPO International | The Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas

The IEA raises a little warning flag on future oil production – World Energy Outlook 2013 | ASPO International | The Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas.

By Kjell Aleklett
Uppsala University
Department of Geosciences and
Visiting professor at University of Texas at Austin
Department of Petroleum and Geosystems Engineering

On 12 November the International Energy Agency (IEA) released this year’s edition of their World Energy Outlook report, WEO-2013. I have not studied all the detail in the report but I listened to the presentation that the IEA’s chief economist, Dr Fatih Birol, gave in London. During the past 10 years I have studied and analysed the World Energy Outlook reports. One of the first detailed analyses that I did was in 2004 regarding WEO-2004. At that time the IEA thought that oil demand in 2030 would be 121 million barrels per day (Mb/d). The conclusion I drew from my analysis was that their prognosis was unrealistic. (http://www.peakoil.net/uhdsg/weo2004/AnalysisWorldEnergyOutlook2004.pdf)
Last year the IEA focused on shale oil in the USA as their main story and the news spread around the world that the USA would overtake Saudi Arabia as the world’s leading oil producer. The news generated many new declarations in the world’s press of “Don’t worry, be happy”. Every year the IEA also focuses on one particular nation or phenomenon that is presented as a large source of oil in future so that we do not need to worry about Peak Oil. Last year it was Iraq that would help to solve all our problems and this year it is Brazil. With this as a background, it is time to look a little more closely at the presentation of the newly released WEO-2013 report.

First, Maria van der Howeven, the Executive Director of the IEA, made some introductory remarks. She noted that the trend we currently have of fossil fuel use will lead to an inability to limit climate change to +2 C of temperature increase. At the same time she also noted that one fifth of the world’s population did not have sufficient access to energy. However, her most remarkable statement was:
“For billions more, any true sense of energy security is undermined by high energy prices. It is now more than five years after the onset of the global financial crisis, yet the recovery remains fragile; for many consumers and businesses, energy prices remain stubbornly high. Alarmingly, oil prices have averaged over $110/barrel since 2011. Such a sustained period of high oil prices is without parallel.

Security, sustainability, and economic prosperity – this is the classic “energy trilemma” that we face.”
When I read those comments I thought of what Christine Lagarde, the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) said in Davos last January regarding the megatrends she saw ahead,

”Increasing vulnerability from resource scarcity and climate change, with the potential for major social and economic disruption”.

We have never previously had global economic growth without increased use of energy. In reality, that means energy from fossil fuels for which oil is the leading component. Ten years ago the coupling between increased energy use and economic growth was what led the IEA to predict an energy demand of 121 Mb/d in 2030. Now they have reduced their expectations to around 100 Mb/d and the analyses we have made of the future show that this level of supply/demand cannot be realized. As IEA this year makes a detailed analysis of oil I have to come back and discuss this. The warning flag that the IEA has now raised should be taken with utmost seriousness.
Dr Fatih Birol’s slides and oral presentation can be found at the IEA’s website (www.iea.org). Considering the limits he probably has on making statements on the future I would regard this year’s presentation as much more nuanced than last year’s. Last year I was actually present when he repeated his presentation in Stockholm. Below are some comments on his presentation.
I share his view that high oil prices affect the economies of oil-importing nations. The fact that the USA has increased production of shale oil means that they do not have the same severity of economic problems with oil as the EU. To import oil at higher prices one must be able to pay for it with increased exports of goods and services. Sweden has succeeded quite with this well while other nations in the EU have not been as successful. The fact that the IEA now asserts that the high oil prices will persist means that it is time for oil importing nations to make fundamental changes in their energy policies.
When the IEA studies which regions have a need to increase oil use it is mainly in the Middle East and India that this is seen. That the increase in use in China is slowing down is expected since they will become increasingly efficient with their energy use in future. The rate of increase of renewable energy use is not expected to grow more than for fossil fuels which means that the proportion that renewables make up of total energy use will continue to be the same as 20 years ago. This rate of increase of fossil fuels points to global warming of +3.6 °C.
Regarding transport fuels the demand for diesel increases three times more than the demand for gasoline. This confirms what I wrote approximately 6 months ago. Another significant change is that the proportion of NGL, natural gas liquids, that is included in oil production statistics increases. In the USA, NGL has already replaced large volumes of oil feedstocks in the chemical industry and this will be an increasing trend.
Then it was time to look at shale oil in the USA. Dr Birol asserted that there would be no second chapter of the shale oil success story that is now playing out in the USA. If one includes NGL then it may be that the USA becomes the world’s largest oil producer around 2020 but its production will then decline. Last year the IEA played down the future importance of the Middle East in oil production but this year they indicated that an increase in oil production from the Middle East is necessary. Those projects that are now seen ahead as necessary have long lead times and the investments must be made now. The increase in oil production that the IEA regarded as necessary from Middle Eastern sources was 6 Mb/d.

Regarding production of conventional oil the IEA maintained its position that the decline in production from existing producing fields is 6% per year, i.e. that same decline rate that we published in 2009. The current rate of production of around 67 Mb/d will decline to 17 Mb/d by 2035 (i.e. in 22 years). Earlier, we don’t see that a realistic compensation for this decline in oil production could be envisaged. A later, more detailed study will show how things progressed this year. What the IEA currently presents as very important is Brazil. Thus, it is time to show again Olle Qvennerstedt’s illustration that describes the World Energy Outlook.

IEA_EIA_OPEC_Qvennerstedt
IEA, EIA and OPEC say “Don’t worry be happy”. Brazil is the happy soccer player in the back corner.

Regarding production of natural gas in the USA expectations are still quite high and my judgment is that these expectations are far too great. To make a better analysis I will need to read the complete WEO-2013 report and that will take some time. The conclusion that the IEA makes is that the price of natural gas in the USA will continue to be much lower than in other parts of the world and this will be significant for global industrial production. This must be interpreted as meaning that industrial production will increase in the USA.

A detailed reading of WEO-2013 will probably give a more nuanced picture of the current and future situation than that I have gained from Dr Birol’s presentation in London. I see future developments of oil production to be weaker than expected and I can definitely say that the polished future predictions made by the IEA ten years ago are well and truly dead and buried. My 2004 analysis has proven justified.

(Comments at Aleklett’s Energy Mix)
Bloomberg has made released an journalist analysis of WEO-2013 that can be read here (Bloomberg)

 

The Sky Is Falling: Chicken Little Was Right All Along, By Don Wilkin « Speaking Truth to Power

The Sky Is Falling: Chicken Little Was Right All Along, By Don Wilkin « Speaking Truth to Power.

ChickenMy obsession with sustainability dates back to 1969, the year I started my doctoral dissertation on human carrying capacity.  I became aware that there was real danger of overshooting that capacity and that if we consumed enough of our ecological capital, we risked a population crash and even possible human extinction.  In the meantime, I warned, we could expect a long, bumpy slide into poverty as resources were used up.  Colleagues accused me of sounding like Chicken Little.

Since then, our exploding consumption, while causing a modest (but temporary) reduction in poverty, has been confused with real prosperity despite global resources having been ravaged and inequality having ballooned to record heights.  I was guilty of underestimating our greed and overestimating the time we had left.  It wasn’t until this last decade that ecological footprint analysis confirmed we had already overshot Earth’s carrying capacity back in the early ‘70s.

The overshoot is now in its fifth decade and continues to gather momentum as the ultimate human ecological disaster:  mass extinction, fisheries depletion, aquifer overpumping, nonrenewable natural resource depletion, soil erosion, glacial melting, ocean acidification, nuclear waste accumulation, more violent storms, rising sea levels, skyrocketing  food prices, plummeting energy return on energy invested, growing numbers of permanently displaced environmental refugees, and growing global financial instability.  Regrettably, 79 million net new people join the global mayhem each year, yet we don’t seem particularly concerned about it, assuming, I suppose, it will take care of itself.  It will.  No one will want to be around when that happens, though.

I am well aware, after nearly a half century of trying, that my sense of impending doom is not widely shared.  The sun still shines, gas tanks are full of ethanol, fridges are fully stocked with thousand-mile salads and 3000-mile bananas, and we are warm and cozy.  Few can even conceive of the possibility of an impending collapse of human civilization, but there are notable exceptions.  My angst is shared by those who, like myself, have studied critical resources in detail and have come to similarly dark conclusions about our future possibilities:  James Hansen, climate; Lester Brown, food production; Craig Dilworth, technology; Chris Clugston, nonrenewable natural resources; Paul Ehrlich, population; Richard Heinberg, fossil fuels; Julian Cribb, agriculture; Paul Farrell, global capital; and Jared Diamond, eco-social collapse, to name a few.  Regrettably, putting lipstick on the pig, their warnings are too often couched in false hope – or as a friend of mine calls it – hopium.  “We can avoid the breakdown of human civilization if only we will work together to (fill in the blank,) if we do it quickly enough.”  One or two of them have likened our situation to being of the same urgency with which we mobilized for World War II.  I’m afraid it is at least that compelling and even that may not prove enough.

In a recent analysis of the world’s nonrenewable natural resources (NNRs), author Chris Clugston found that, as of the economic collapse of 2008, 63 of our 89 most critical NNRs were globally scarce.  In a private conversation, he believed that 2008 was the peak of human material well-being and he expected, after plateauing for maybe a decade, it would be sharply downhill from there.  In 2012, he stated his belief that global economic/societal collapse was “possible within the next 5 years, probable within 15, and all but certain within 25.”  The year 2017 struck an ominous note because that was the deadline the International Energy Agency gave us for substantially reducing carbon emissions or risking runaway global climate change.  We’ve made virtually no progress since their warning.  Quite the contrary.  A highly fracked economy (no pun intended) has more than fully “recovered” from its 2008 meltdown and we’re off to the GDP races once again, setting new records for energy consumption every year.  Though economists rejoice, climate scientists and ecologists shudder.

The Global Footprint Network has been refining their methods for several decades now.  Their analyses are solid.  When they say we are consuming 50% more than Earth’s annual ecological restorative capacity, you can be sure it’s at least that, and such profligacy has to have consequences.  Their analysis shows that, since 1970, Earth’s overall restorative capacity has declined by almost half while the human population has more than doubled and overall resource consumption has increased even more.  This suggests that, by 2060, it could all be over – no more reserve bio-capacity left anywhere.  That’s when human death rates must necessarily skyrocket, if they haven’t already.

Deny-ers insist we’re doing just fine.  As technologically gifted as we are and with God on our side wanting us all to be rich, we will work it out with little personal discomfort or sacrifice.  The world’s plummeting ecological capacity puts the lie to such Pollyannish delusions.  By the time reality sets in, our global ecological accounts will be all but empty and there won’t be anything left to restore.

The physical impossibility of continuing as we presently are for more than another few decades seems lost on the vast majority, despite the clarity and preponderance of all monitored trends now.  If only a handful of us and practically no public officials really believe such a meltdown is coming, what can realistically be done to prepare for it?  Can we avoid having to reduce our population?  Couldn’t we all just live more sustainably?  Fat chance.  It isn’t reasonable to expect the third-world, now experiencing for the first time the goodies they have watched middle class Americans enjoy for generations, to voluntarily cut back on their newly acquired tastes for personal vehicles, computers, cell phones, meat, milk, and eggs.  Nor, in truth, are formerly-middle-class Americans likely to give up too much more than they already have.  People don’t commonly volunteer to live in deeper poverty, no matter how worthy the cause, having once experienced the benefits of wealth, privilege, and relative immunity from disease, crime, and violence.  Typical half-hearted attempts at sustainable lifestyles in the western world won’t forestall global economic collapse anyway and they could even trigger it.  The optimum time for funding alternative energy with a good stiff carbon tax was about twenty years ago.

Despite well-meaning attempts by many of my friends to live more sustainably, I am convinced the only equitable, humane, and effective way to pull our fat out of the fire at this late date, if it could be done at all, would be to immediately and dramatically reduce human fertility worldwide to half of replacement for the next three to four generations, somewhere between “one or none” and “one will do, stop at two.”   All other attempts to live more sustainably would be – in fact are being – entirely undone by our huge and growing numbers.  Such restraint would have to continue until we got our numbers WAY down, certainly below a billion, and possibly below half a billion depending on how long it took.  That level of voluntary reproductive restraint, I don’t need to tell you, would be unprecedented in human history.  Economic collapse is a far more probable resolution to our overshoot problem.

Realistically, most of us won’t survive global economic collapse.  The vast majority of us have neither the skills nor the resources to survive in a purely local economy.  Despite the earnest efforts of groups like Sierra Club and the Transitions network, it is unlikely that anything can now stop the global economy – and human civilization with it – from collapsing around our heads sometime in the next two to four decades.  Most will apparently blithely continue to enjoy our final faux prosperity while it lasts.  By the time the meltdown gets their full and undivided attention, it will be too late.  The only question then will be how many, if any, will survive to start the insanity all over again?  God forbid.

I take little comfort in being old enough to be cashing in my chips before the most serious stages of civilization’s decline and collapse.  That doesn’t make it any better for my kids and grandkids.  I feel we owe them a realistic assessment of the predicament we have left them.  My heartfelt warning to them is that children born today are probably being sentenced, should they survive to adulthood, to living through the darkest period of human history.  The decision to bring a child into the world today is – or should be – an excruciating one, a choice between small hope for a survivable future with starkly limited opportunities versus a far higher probability of a much more debased, dispiriting one.

I personally would choose not to reproduce now even if I could (my vasectomy has sealed that path.)  If this past century represents the pinnacle of human ability to sustainably manage and equitably share our global commons, and if, despite our (apparently benumbed) big brains and digital libraries overflowing with the accumulated wisdom of all human history, we can aspire to no higher economic goals than ever-greater material consumption, constant growth, and perpetual crowding at the expense of all other species on this planet, including other humans, it might be better if human reproduction were put on the evolutionary back burner for a very long while.  Only a radical pruning provides any hope for a post-human “founder” population sometime in the future with substantially more reverent attitudes toward Earth and more caring and social responsibility toward one another.

A final point – one can guarantee an argument merely by suggesting the need to stabilize, let alone reduce, human numbers.  After worshiping at the altar of perpetual growth for 200 years, that’s pure sacrilege.  One can elicit even greater anger by pointing out that what evolutionary success we have had to this point has been a result of inborn proto-socialist tendencies in all human beings.  We are a modestly evolved social mammal, and socialist (small “s”) – or mutualistic – or cooperative – communities have been central to whatever evolutionary success we have enjoyed as a species.  This fact suggests the best and possibly only way forward from here, at least for an insightful few.  To wit:

If we do manage to pull back from the abyss, or if enough of us survive the plunge, it will surely be because small groups of us have formed mutualistic communities for the express purpose of helping one another eke out a largely local living from a depleted planet Earth. We will be painfully aware, by then, that a sustainable lifestyle must involve subordinating our reproductive inclinations to the long-term well-being, not just of our own community, but of the larger ecological community on which our well-being depends.  We will certainly understand that a global ecosystem is a sacred trust that demands our respect and, yes, our reverence.  Finally, we will need the humility to understand that we need a healthy global ecosystem far more than it needs us, and that we need to invest at least as much of our treasure in husbanding that priceless natural legacy as in pursuing our own material well-being.

Don Wilkin is a Human Ecologist and may be contacted at: wilkin@olympus.net

 

 

Peak Oil responds, “The report of my death was an exaggeration.”

Peak Oil responds, “The report of my death was an exaggeration.”

my_tombstone

A recent post entitled The Welcome Death of Peak Oil by George Koch on the Ludwig von Mises Institute of Canada website begins with the following optimistic comment: “Improved technology and more efficiency mean North America could eventually become an oil exporter.” [i]   The author goes on to argue that technology has placed the theory of Peak Oil in its grave and that energy independence for North America is just around the corner. That Peak Oil is a mistaken and buried theory has been argued recently elsewhere,[ii] and the idea of North American energy independence is one that has been and continues to be widely disseminated by the corporate media, the oil industry, and investment firms.[iii] There is one significant problem, however. The statement is based on an unsound foundation.

The notion that hydraulic fracturing will result in American energy independence appears to have been debunked.[iv] In fact, just recently Faith Birol, president of the International Energy Administration, has stated that the increase in American oil production is simply a surge, not a revolution.[v]  To put it simply: the bold assertion of energy independence is predicated on early production numbers of shale oil wells; unfortunately, these production rates cannot be sustained for very long except through an exponential increase in the number of wells drilled.[vi] This only serves, however, to increase the speed at which the resource deposit is drawn-down, quickening the arrival of the day that the wells will no longer be economically viable. It is interesting to note that a number of companies have already lost money investing in shale oil and others are actively looking to get out of the business.[vii]

If an argument’s underlying foundation is faulty, then it is axiomatic that the conclusion drawn from it is also flawed. To paraphrase that classic movie, Monty Python and The Holy Grail, Peak Oil is ‘not quite dead yet’. In fact, I would argue that it is alive and as pertinent as ever, perhaps more so. I offer the following evidence to support that view.

While the American government was not interested in the topic of Peak Oil when Marion King Hubbert first proposed the model for petroleum resource depletion in 1948, by 1974, shortly after his prediction of US oil production peaking became reality, Hubbert was asked to provide written testimony to a Congressional committee writing the National Energy Conservation Policy Act as to the impact of Peak Oil on the monetary system.[viii] Jimmy Carter’s administration was driven by the concept of finite resources, creating the Department of Energy and prompting the president to present the issues in a televised speech in 1977.[ix]

More recently, the secretive National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG)–that was created only ten days after George Bush defeated Al Gore for the 2001 presidency and placed under the direct authority of Vice President Dick Cheney–brainstormed for ten meetings over an nine week period from January to May 2001 about Peak Oil and other energy security issues; issues that would significantly shape American government policies for the next few years. Although agendas and minutes of the meetings have been classified, seven pages were released after two lawsuits. These pages show that the group was reviewing how much oil remained in the world, where it was located, and who controlled it.[x] The public report from the NEPDG made dozens of recommendations based on the underlying belief that oil resources were finite and securing them were in the national interest of the United States.[xi]

The picture has not changed. The shale oil ‘boom’ is a short-term blip in a long-term trend that has been known to the American government for decades. The fact is the previous American administration perceived the issue of energy security as one requiring immediate response by all levels of government. I think most would acknowledge that the geopolitical tensions and military interactions in the Middle East over the last several decades have been centred upon one main objective: control of the oil and gas in the region. The idea of Peak Oil was very much driving American policy, especially foreign policy, less than a decade ago and it’s naïve to believe it is no longer a driving force in the current administration’s geopolitical strategising. Despite assurances and rhetoric, the current administration has not drawn down the number of military personnel in the Middle East and has actually become involved in additional conflicts in the region (e.g. Libya, Syria).[xii]

Leaving North America for the moment. It was only three years ago that the Future Analysis Branch of the Bundeswher Transformation Centre, a branch of the German military,[xiii] carried out its initial study for the German government’s Federal Ministry of Defence on the impact of Peak Oil.[xiv] As taken from the report’s Forward: “…the purpose of security-related future analysis is to acquire knowledge precociously and scientifically based in order to refine conceptual specifications and objectives without making predictions…[and] to enable the Federal Ministry of Defence to identify long-term issues with relevance to security policy at an early stage...” That Germany focused this branch’s first research on the topic of Peak Oil and its security implications speaks volumes as to the seriousness of finite oil resources and how they will impact the globe.

But back to the idea that Peak Oil is dead and buried. Here is what the report has to say: “It is a fact, however, that oil is finite and that there is a peak oil. Since this study is mainly focused on understanding cause-effect relations following such a peak oil situation, it is not necessary to specify a precise point in time…. Depending on the development of globally relevant factors, we cannot rule out that peak oil could have serious security policy implications within the review period of the 30-year investigation perspective” (emphasis added). So, the German military and the German Federal Defence Department not only believe that Peak Oil exists, but that the country must begin to prepare for the implications of Peak Oil sooner rather than later.

I think one has to take a step back in temporal perspective to get a good view of Peak Oil and to understand it and its implications for our global, industrial world. After about 200,000 years of low energy existence, humans happened upon a one-time windfall of energy-intensive resources and it has taken us less than two centuries to reach the production peak of this resource bonanza. On the way up the curve we have used the easy-to-retrieve and highest energy-return-on-energy-invested (EROEI) resources first, leaving us the less energy efficient (lower EROEI) and much more difficult-to-retrieve and expensive dregs; much of which may never get extracted.

Small ‘successes’, such as that of the American shale oil industry’s, are seen as minor deviations or perturbations in the long-term picture that emerges. For example, discoveries at Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, bumped up American oil production for a few years in the late 1970s and early 1980s but by the mid- to late-1980s the country resumed its journey down the Hubbert curve that began in 1970. The same pattern seems to be emerging with the ‘shale boom;’ a slight blip in the production numbers for a couple of years beginning in late 2009 and then it will be back to the downward slide of Hubbert’s Peak in the not-too-distant future.

alaska and shale

This is not just true of the U.S.. It is true of every oil-producing country. Peak Oil is factual and based upon geologic patterns observed in every finite resource extracted to date. In fact, M.K. Hubbert predated his work on petroleum resources by studying extraction rates for various minerals that mimic the Hubbert curve.[xv]

The implications of Peak Oil are sure to be extremely upsetting to many. They range from James Howard Kunstler and John Michael Greer’s argument that the transition from fossil fuels will be a rather gradual fall from grace that will take generations, with possible spits and spurts of crises[xvi], to Michael Ruppert’s more apocalyptic and quick-moving collapse scenario. The reality of it, however, cannot be denied. But denial, of course, is the first stage of the Kubler-Ross model, also known as the five stages of grief, that psychiatrist Elisabeth Kubler-Ross uses to argue that when faced with impending death or some other horrible fate, a person will experience a series of emotional stages: denial, anger, bargaining, depression and acceptance.[xvii]

We won’t know when we’ve actually passed the peak of the Hubbert Curve with respect to oil production except in retrospect, and there are not likely to be any apocalyptic scenarios emerging as a result when we do; the truth is we may have already passed the point–global production rates of conventional oil have not moved above the levels reached in 2005/06.[xviii] There are many who have learned to accept it as inevitable but there are also a great many people still in the denial stage about Peak Oil.

Until more people arrive at the last stage of acceptance, we are destined to hear and read more stories with the theme reflected in Koch’s post. That Peak Oil is dead, technology will continue to save the day, and it’s time to move along, there’s nothing to see here. Unfortunately, I believe that the longer we maintain policies based on a denial of its existence, the less likely we will be able to prepare ourselves adequately and the more dire of the consequences will emerge.

What will befall an energy-dependent society as it begins its trip down the global, post-peak curve of Hubbert’s model can only be imagined. Will it reflect the brutal world of the television show Revolution where the power grid has failed due to wayward nanites?[xix] While failure of the grid in this science fiction series is not the result of Peak Oil, grid failure is a real possibility in a post-Peak Oil world, as pointed out by Richard Duncan in his Olduvai Theory.[xx] Will there be a massive die-off of humans as some predict?[xxi] Nobody knows.

One thing is sure though.

Peak Oil is dead, long live Peak Oil.


[i] G. Koch. The Welcome Death of Peak Oil. http://mises.ca/posts/blog/the-welcome-death-of-peak-oil/. November 9, 2013.

[ii] R. Wile. Peak Oil is Dead. http://www.businessinsider.com/death-of-peak-oil-2013-3. March 29, 2013.

B. Walsh. The IEA Says Peak Oil is Dead. That’s Bad News for Climate Policy.

http://science.time.com/2013/05/15/the-iea-says-peak-oil-is-dead-thats-bad-news-for-climate-policy/. May 15, 2013.

D. Blockman. As Fracking Rises, Peak Oil Theory Slowly Dies. http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidblackmon/2013/07/16/as-fracking-rises-peak-oil-theory-slowly-dies/. July 16, 2013.

K. Smith. No Peak Oil Really is Dead.

http://www.forbes.com/sites/modeledbehavior/2013/07/17/no-peak-oil-really-is-dead/. July 17, 2013.

[iii] G. Smith. U.S. to Be Top Oil Producer by 2015 on Shale, IEA says.

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-12/u-s-nears-energy-independence-by-2035-on-shale-boom-iea-says.html. November 12, 2013.

P. Domm. Ship, baby, ship! Calls come for U.S. to export oil. http://www.cnbc.com/id/101087815. October 4, 2013.

R. Plank. North American Energy Independence Now Possible. http://www.chron.com/business/energy/article/North-American-energy-independence-now-possible-4007354.php. November 4, 2012.

D. Burney and F.O. Hanson. Pipelines are the ticket to North American energy independence. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/pipelines-are-the-ticket-to-north-american-energy-independence/article8952216/. February 22, 2013.

C. Assis. North America energy independent by 2020, but still tied to markets: report. http://blogs.marketwatch.com/energy-ticker/2013/09/27/north-america-energy-independent-by-2020-but-still-tied-to-markets-report/. September 27, 2013

Wood Mackenzie Press Release. Wood Mackenzie: Global Geopolitics Reshaped by North American Energy Independence. http://www.woodmacresearch.com/cgi-bin/wmprod/portal/corp/corpPressDetail.jsp?oid=11572576. September 26, 2013.

S. Arsenault. U.S. could reclaim role as net energy exporter. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/08/2013831142514713250.html. August 31, 2013.

[iv] W. Koch. Could fracking boom peter out sooner that DOE expects? http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/11/03/fracking-boom-bust-us-energy-independence/3328561/. November 3, 2013.

T. Whipple. The Peak Oil Crisis: The Shale Oil Bubble. http://www.resilience.org/stories/2013-10-30/the-peak-oil-crisis-the-shale-oil-bubble. October 30, 2013.

R. Heinberg. America’s natural gas revolution isn’t all it’s ‘fracked’ up to be. http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2013/1023/America-s-natural-gas-revolution-isn-t-all-it-s-fracked-up-to-be. October 23, 2013.

M. Mushalik. The U.S. will always remain a crude oil importer. http://www.resilience.org/stories/2013-10-31/us-will-always-remain-crude-oil-importer. October 31, 2013.

S. Kelly. Could California’s Shall Oil Boom Be Just a Mirage? http://www.desmogblog.com/2013/11/07/could-california-s-shale-oil-be-just-mirage. November 7, 2013.

M. Lardelli. The propaganda campaign against peaking fossil fuel production. http://www.resilience.org/stories/2013-11-05/the-propaganda-campaign-against-peaking-fossil-fuel-production. November 5, 2013.

J.D. Hughes. Drill, Baby, Drill: Can unconventional fuels usher in a new era of energy abundance? http://www.postcarbon.org/reports/DBD-report-FINAL.pdf. February 2013.

[v] K. Cobb. Will the real International Energy Agency please stand up? http://resourceinsights.blogspot.ca/2013/11/will-real-international-energy-agency.html/ November 16, 2013.

[vi] SRSrocco. The coming bust of the great Bakken Oil Field. http://srsroccoreport.com/the-coming-bust-of-the-great-bakken-oil-field/the-coming-bust-of-the-great-bakken-oil-field/. November 16, 2013.

M. Katusa. U.S. #1 in Oil: So Why Isn’t Gasoline $0.80 per Gallon? http://www.caseyresearch.com/cdd/us-1-in-oil-so-why-isnt-gasoline-0.80-per-gallon. October 29, 2013.

[vii] K. Sloan. What’s next for oil shale? http://thebusinesstimes.com/whats-next-for-oil-shale/. October 8, 2013.

G. Chazan. Shell write-down bad new for US shale.

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/cf41cc36-fab2-11e2-87b9-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2jdcgNfoR. August 1, 2013.

G. Chazan. Peter Voser says he regrets Shell’s huge bet on US shale.

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e964a8a6-2c38-11e3-8b20-00144feab7de.html?siteedition=intl. October 6, 2013.

[viii] M. King Hubbert. On the Nature of Growth. http://www.hubbertpeak.com/hubbert/OnTheNatureOfGrowth.pdf. 1974.

[ix] J. Carter. Primary Resources: Proposed Energy Policy. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/primary-resources/carter-energy/. April 18, 1977.

Miller Center, University of Virginia. Jimmy Carter. http://millercenter.org/president/carter/essays/biography/print.

[x] M. Ruppert. Collapse. http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1503769/. 2009.

Wikipedia. Energy Task Force. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_Task_Force

On the Issues. Dick Cheney on Energy and Oil. http://www.ontheissues.org/celeb/Dick_Cheney_Energy_+_Oil.htm.

Haliburton Watch. Energy Task Force. http://www.halliburtonwatch.org/about_hal/energytf.html.

Sourcewatch. Cheney Energy Task Force. http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Cheney_Energy_Task_Force.

[xi] Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group: Reliable, Affordable, and Environmentally Sound Energy for America’s Future. http://www.gcrio.org/OnLnDoc/pdf/nep.pdf. May 2001.

[xii] T. Dokoupil. Who’s the War President? http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/08/05/president-obama-president-bush-and-the-march-of-u-s-soldiers-abroad-where-they-are-and-why.html. August 5, 2011.

D. Degraw. Obama Far Outdoes Bush in Escalating War–The Numbers Will Surprise You. http://www.alternet.org/story/144449/obama_far_outdoes_bush_in_escalating_war_–_the_numbers_will_surprise_you. December 8, 2009.

P. Woodward. More US troops deployed overseas under Obama than Bush. http://warincontext.org/2009/10/13/more-us-troops-deployed-overseas-under-obama-than-bush/. October 13, 2009.

[xiv] Future Analysis Branch, Bundeswher Transformation Centre. Peak Oil: Security policy implications of scarce resources. http://www.jpods.com/JPods/004Studies/PeakOil_StudyEN_GermanArmy.pdf. November 2010.

[xv] M. King Hubbert. Future Ore Supply and Geophysical Prospecting: Mineral Properties Now Entering a  New Epoch. http://www.hubbertpeak.com/hubbert/FutureOreSupply.pdf. January 1934.

[xvi] J.M. Greer. The Long Descent: A User’s Guide to the End of the Industrial Age. http://www.newsociety.com/Books/L/The-Long-Descent. 2008.

J.H. Kunstler. The Long Emergency: Surviving the Converging Catastrophes of the Twenty-First Century. http://www.amazon.ca/The-Long-Emergency-Catastrophes-Twenty-First/dp/0802142494. 2005.

[xviii] M. McDermott. IEA chart says conventional oil production peaked in 2006. http://www.treehugger.com/corporate-responsibility/iea-chart-says-conventional-oil-production-peaked-in-2006.html. November 11, 2010.

D. Biello. Has Petroleum Production Peaked, Ending the Era of Easy Oil?  http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=has-peak-oil-already-happened. January 25, 2012.

[xix] Wikipedia. Revolution (TV Series). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolution_(TV_series).

[xx] R. Duncan. The Olduvai Theory. http://www.thesocialcontract.com/artman2/publish/tsc1602/article_1362.shtml. Winter 2005/06.

The Olduvai Theory: Terminal Decline Imminent. http://www.thesocialcontract.com/artman2/publish/tsc1602/article_1362.shtml. Spring 2007.

America: A Frog in the Kettle Slowly Coming to a Boil.

http://www.thesocialcontract.com/artman2/publish/tsc1602/article_1362.shtml. Fall 2007.

The Olduvai Theory: Towards Re-Equalizing the World Standard of Living. http://www.thesocialcontract.com/artman2/publish/tsc1602/article_1362.shtml. Summer 2009.

[xxi] M. Savinar. The Peak Oil and Die-Off. http://www.unicamp.br/fea/ortega/eco/traducao-DieOff.pdf

J. Siman. Speaking very gently about die-off. http://www.resilience.org/stories/2006-10-10/speaking-very-gently-about-die. October 10, 2006.

N. Hagens. Jay Hansen and Dieoff.org. http://www.theoildrum.com/story/2006/7/13/21018/2121. July 24, 2006.

Will the real International Energy Agency please stand up?

Will the real International Energy Agency please stand up 

by Kurt Cobb, originally published by Resource Insights  | NOV 16, 2013

It was as if the International Energy Agency were appearing on the old American television game show To Tell the Truth last week as it offered a third contradictory forecast in the space of a year.

You may recall that on To Tell the Truth the host would begin by reading a statement from a person with an unusual story or profession. Then, a celebrity panel would question three contestants who claimed to be that person. Afterwards, the panelists would vote on whom they believed was the real person. Finally, the host would say, “Will the real [name of person] please stand up?” (Some episodes are still availablehere on YouTube.)

The difference is that the contestants on To Tell the Truth would try to tell similar, plausible stories so as to stump the panel. In the non-game-show world of energy forecasting, the IEA–a consortium of 28 countries, all net oil importers except for Canada and Norway–plays all three contestants and does not even attempt to be consistent. So, it’s possible that the agency is just a collective mental case withmultiple personality disorder.

However, one has to allow for the fact that the IEA is not just one person or one voice. Still, if the agency were a single person, what it has released over the last year as official pronouncements would likely have a psychiatrist reaching for theDSM-IV (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition).

Last November in its 2012 World Energy Outlook (WEO), the agency noted rising U.S. oil production and even predicted that the United States would become energy self-sufficient by 2035 (a doubtful call, in my view). It also noted that growing oil demand in the Asia has more than outweighed declines in European and U.S. consumption, keeping upward pressure on prices. It said that growth in Iraq’s oil exports was not a sure thing. While the 2012 WEO is really a rather optimistic document on supply, it did not paint an especially rosy picture, indicating that obtaining the supplies of oil necessary to meet projected demand was not a foregone conclusion.

Then, only six months later came the agency’s so-called Medium-Term Oil Market Report which read like an ad for the North American oil and gas industry. The agency touted a “supply shock” in oil from American tight oil fields unleashed by a new kind of hydraulic fracturing–a shock that would send “ripples throughout the world.” Unlike six months earlier, worldwide supply was supposed to take flight on the wings of fracking.

This enthusiasm didn’t last long. In its latest report, the just-issued 2013 World Energy Outlook, the agency sounded like a group of Gloomy Guses noting that “Brent crude oil has averaged $110 per barrel in real terms since 2011, a sustained period of high oil prices that is without parallel in oil market history.”

The report goes on to say, “The capacity of technologies to unlock new types of resources, such as light tight oil (LTO) and ultra-deepwater fields, and to improve recovery rates in existing fields is pushing up estimates of the amount of oil that remains to be produced. But this does not mean that the world is on the cusp of a new era of oil abundance.” The most recent forecast calls for rising oil prices in real terms through 2035. This is in part because the agency expects that “no country replicates the level of success with LTO” that we are seeing in the United States today.

What’s really happening here? Is the IEA getting better at seeing the future? Not really. What’s happening is that the IEA is being asked to do something which it cannot possibly do: accurately predict oil supplies 22 years into the future. So, given this impossible task, the agency responds by following current trends (and industry hype) and then extrapolating them.

Now that the IEA has had a chance to re-examine the industry’s claims in light of more experience with tight oil development, it is backing off its previous assessment in its Medium-Term Oil Market Report from May. Fatih Birol, chief economist for the IEA, told the Financial Times that he would now characterize rising oil production in the United States as “a surge, rather than a revolution.” He expects OPEC to become dominant once again in oil markets early in the next decade. The Financial Times characterized the report as predicting an oil supply crunch.

But, will the IEA have a change of heart once again? It might, depending on what it hears from industry sources and what it chooses to believe. But, the takeaway from the last year of IEA projections is not that the agency is suffering some sort of breakdown, but that it has been given an impossible task that in the volatile world of oil supplies has it casting about for a coherent story. In short, it is trying to tell the truth without knowing the truth for the simple reason that in this case the truth cannot known. That has made it a poor contestant in its own real-life episode of To Tell the Truth stretched out over the past year.

It is a fool’s errand to try to predict the future of world energy supplies. But, it is even more foolish to base our public policy, business and personal decisions on such predictions.

P. S. There is a minor acknowledgement that such forecasts are exercises in futility in a disclaimer at the end of the 2013 World Energy Outlook summary. The disclaimer reads: “The IEA makes no representation or warranty, express or implied, in respect of the publication’s contents (including its completeness or accuracy) and shall not be responsible for any use of, or reliance on, the publication.” This is standard boilerplate, I know. But, it is not the kind of language that inspires confidence.

 

Hitler Finds Out About Peak Oil

How Much Energy do we Really Need?

How Much Energy do we Really Need?. (source)

By Breakthrough Institute | Fri, 01 November 2013 23:22 |
Benefit From the Latest Energy Trends and Investment Opportunities before the mainstream media and investing public are aware they even exist. The Free Oilprice.com Energy Intelligence Report gives you this and much more. Click here to find out more.

In the early 1920s, when my grandparents were just small children, only about 40% of Americans had access to electricity. Over the course of a generation that number reached close to 100%. Today, inexpensive, reliable and plentiful access to electricity is something that most people in OECD countries take for granted. I was reminded about this when I attended the recent annual meeting of the Colorado Rural Electric Association, a group that decidedly does not take electricity for granted. The meeting was opened by appealing to core shared values: “The greatest thing on earth is to have the love of God in your heart, and the next greatest thing is to have electricity in your house.”

Yet billions of people around the world today do not have electricity in their houses. And while most projections see energy use expanding greatly in the coming decades, they also expect 1 to 2 billion to be living without electricity even by 2035. That may very well be the future we get. But it doesn’t have to be the future we work toward. To the extent that we allow such forecasts to constrain our debates over global energy and climate change mitigation, we do a disservice to the global poor, whose future wellbeing will undoubtedly require more-robust energy access.

Related article: Institutional Investors Concerned About “Unburnable Carbon” Fallout

The US Energy Information Administration, for example, projects that world energy consumption will increase by the equivalent of about 4,000 power plants in 2035 (about 1.7% per year) — or from 500 quads to 770 quads. A “quad” is a quadrillion BTUs, or about the same energy produced over a year by 15 1-gigawatt power plants, e.g., nuclear, coal or gas. While 4,000 new power plants worth of energy consumption sounds like a lot, after taking projected population growth into account, by 2035 global per capita energy use increases only by about 23% (data from the World Bank and the United Nations). In other words, from 2010 to 2035 global per capita energy consumption is projected to grow from about the average per capita consumption of Chile today to that of Croatia today, which is not a big change.

Advancing global human development requires that we ask different questions.

Rather than starting from today and asking how much energy the world might consume in 2035, let’s turn the question upside down. Let’s postulate different levels of energy access, efficiency, and equity for 2035, and ask what it would imply in terms of required energy supply, applying an approach that policy wonks call “backcasting.”

For instance, consider sub-Saharan Africa (minus South Africa), which today has about 30 gigawatts of electricity generating capacity, according to Morgan Bazilian, Deputy Director of the Joint Institute for Strategic Energy Analysis. To raise the region to the average per capita electricity access available in South Africa would require 1,000 gigawatts (source here in PDF). In other words, sub-Saharan Africa would need to increase its installed capacity by 33 times to reach the level of energy use enjoyed by South Africans — and 100 times to reach that of Americans.  The scale of the energy access challenge is enormous.

For this exercise I am going to start with a focus on electricity consumption, and use three countries in 2010 as analogies — Bulgaria, Germany and the United States — to represent low, medium and high levels of energy access assuming levels of efficiency and equity similar to each. In 2010 Bulgaria saw about 4,500 kWh of electricity consumption per capita per year, Germany 7,100 and the US 13,400. For comparison, the International Energy Agency defines “energy access” to be about 250 kWh per household per year, or about 2% of that used in the average American household. The global average in 2010 was just under 3,000 kWh per capita per year.

Ambition Gap in GLobal Energy Access

The implied increase in electricity consumption by 2035 to bring the world average to Bulgaria, Germany and US 2010 levels is 88%, 200% and 460%. These represent annual increases in electricity consumption of 2.6%, 4.5% and 7.2% respectively.  Because the EIA projects electricity production to grow at a rate faster than overall energy consumption, the Bulgaria (low) scenario is similar to its projection for overall growth in global energy consumption to 2035.

Bulgaria’s 2010 GDP was $14,160 (World Bank PPP Dollars), and the world average was $11,500. Attaining a 2035 global average per capita GDP equal to that of Bulgaria in 2010 implies an annual GDP global growth rate of 0.8%, which seems low, both in historical perspective and with respect to expectations. In contrast, Germany’s 2010 GDP was $40,230 and the US was $48,820, which if were to be the global average in 2035 imply annual growth rates of 4.5% and 7.2% respectively.

Global Energy Access

Let’s try to put these numbers into perspective with respect to total energy consumption in 2035. In terms of quads, the low, medium and high scenarios imply a total 2035 consumption of 940, 1,500 and 2,310 quads, or an increase over the EIA 2035 projection of 170, 1,000 and 1,810 quads. These represent the equivalent of a doubling, a tripling and more than a quadrupling of global energy consumption in 2010. Of course, different assumptions (e.g., about electricity vs. liquid fuels, etc.) will lead to different numbers, but qualitatively much the same results. Global energy access as you and I understand the concept implies massive amounts of new energy.

Related article: Fukushima Amplifies Japanese Energy Import Dependence

Another way to evaluate these numbers is to compare them to the magnitude of the energy challenge implied by policies seeking to address climate change. Decarbonizing the global economy to a degree consistent with low stabilization targets for atmospheric carbon dioxide implies replacing about 80% of current energy – about 400 quads – and meeting all future energy demand with carbon free sources of energy.  A 2035 world which consumes energy at the level of 2010 Bulgaria implies more than a doubling of needed carbon-free energy. Germany and US equivalency implies almost a quadrupling and close to a sextupling, respectively. Is it any wonder that many stabilization scenarios used in climate policy analyses keep poor people mostly poor?

So what to take from these numbers? I suggest three conclusions.

First, a world of energy access as that concept is understood by most people in the wealthy parts of the world implies a level of energy consumption far beyond that contained in conventional projections of consumption for the next several decades. Securing such energy access will require much greater policy attention than has so far been devoted to the issue. Just as in the US in my grandparents’ generation, market forces alone will be insufficient to provide energy for all. Concerted public action, perhaps coordinated to some degree globally, will be necessary.

Second, the magnitude of the challenge of providing energy for all is at least as large as the challenge implied by accumulating carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, and perhaps many times larger. Independent of the climate issue, there are good justifications why diversifying the global energy mix beyond fossil fuels makes sense, for security, environmental, health and economic reasons.

It would therefore seem obvious that those who prioritize climate might find common ground with those who favor increasing energy access to support major new initiatives in energy innovation and deployment. Such an approach would at least address the split between rich and poor nations that has characterized international climate policies for decades. Further, a wealthier world with more equity in energy access will be far better positioned to deal with the technological challenges of decarbonization. Those in the climate movement who express frustration that their issue has not been judged important enough to motivate aggressive steps toward energy innovation have overlooked energy access as a much broader base for securing and sustaining broad support around the world for advances in energy technologies and their deployment.

Finally, independent of time scale, the world is irreversibly moving towards greater energy access – in fits and starts to be sure — but there can be no doubt about the aspirations of the almost 6 billion people in non-OECD countries who collectively consume as much energy as the 1.2 billion in OECD countries. The world of the future will consume vastly more energy than the world today. The only questions are how efficiently and effectively we get to that high energy world. Putting energy access at the center of policy discussions would be a smart first step.

By. Roger Pielke Jr.

 

Canadian environmentalists paint catastrophic picture of oilsands for U.S. lawmakers | canada.com

Canadian environmentalists paint catastrophic picture of oilsands for U.S. lawmakers | canada.com. (FULL ARTICLE)

WASHINGTON — Five prominent Canadian environmentalists told Washington lawmakers this week that the Keystone XL pipeline will lead to such a huge growth in oilsands’ carbon emissions, it will help tip the world into catastrophic climate change.

Although Prime Minister Stephen Harper recently told Americans that Canada would not take “no for an answer” on the pipeline,  until the project is approved, the environmentalists said further expansion of the oilsands should be immediately stopped – followed by a gradual shutdown of all operations.

“The current trajectory for the growth of the tar sands is consistent with the International Energy Agency’s prediction of a six-degree (Celsius) growth in the temperature on the planet,” Tim Gray, executive director of Environmental Defence Canada, told reporters Friday at a news conference. “That is a catastrophic scenario.”

“Most of the oil that remains in the ground in Alberta has to stay there,” he added.

The environmentalists, who included broadcaster and scientist David Suzuki, came to the U.S. capital to counter what they claim is a disinformation campaign waged over the last eight months by Canadian politicians….

 

“Peak Oil Demand” = Peak Oil

“Peak Oil Demand” = Peak Oil.

 

Arab Countries Openly Discuss Peak Oil for the First Time | CollapseNet

Arab Countries Openly Discuss Peak Oil for the First Time | CollapseNet.

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